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Aesthetic sense and social cognition: a 
story from the Early Stone Age1 
[Penultimate version] 
Human aesthetic practices show a sensitivity to the ways that 
the appearance of an artefact manifests skills and other 
qualities of the maker.  We investigate a possible origin for this 
kind of sensibility, locating it in the need for co-ordination of 
skill-transmission in the Acheulean stone tool culture. We argue 
that our narrative supports the idea that Acheulian agents were 
aesthetic agents. In line with this we offer what may seem an 
absurd comparison: between the Acheulian and the 
Quattrocento. In making it we display some hidden richness in 
what counts as an aesthetic response to an artefact. We 
conclude with a brief review of rival explanations—biological 
and/or cultural—of how this skills-based sensibility became a 
regular feature of human aesthetic practices. 
 
The aim of painting: to give pleasure, good will and fame to the 
painter, more than riches.                                      
Alberti, On Painting2  
 
1. Aesthetics and the act of making 
While aesthetics occupies a modest, respectable corner of philosophy, 
the scholars best placed to apply its results to the human world—
anthropologists, archaeologists and art historians—generally respond 
to its ideas with indifference or hostility.3 There’s a notion abroad that 
aesthetics celebrates the resources of uncontaminated perceptual 
experience, isolated from meaning, use, status or anything else of 
significance.4 Yet within contemporary aesthetics this same view is 
                                                             
1 A distant ancestor of this paper was given at the conference on Remote Access: The 
Philosophy, Anthropology, and Archaeology of Remote Visual Conspicuousness, Frei 
Universität Berlin, 2018; thanks to Whitney Davis, Marilynn Johnson, Jonas 
Grethlein, Lambros Malafouris, Sam Rose, Jakub Stejskal and Marilyn Strathern for 
their comments at the meeting, to Ellen Winner and Penny Spikins for discussion, 
and to the editors of and two readers for Synthese.  
2 Alberti, Leon Battista. De Pictura, 1435-36. Translated by John R. Spencer. New 
Haven: Yale University Press. 1970. 
3 But see below, text to note 32. 
4A writer on native Australian painting offers this very narrow characterisation of 
what is supposed to be a “Western” aesthetic: “… with highly symbolic works, an 
inability to comprehend meaning does not appear to impede our aesthetic sense at 
all” (Elizabeth Burns Coleman, Appreciating "Traditional" Aboriginal Painting, 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 62, (2004), 235-247). For commentary on 
views of this kind see Greg Currie, Art and the anthropologists. In A. Shimamura 
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widely rejected exactly because it is unable to do justice to the 
richness and complexity of aesthetic judgement.5 Take for example 
our sensitivity to the ways an artefact’s appearance is a trace of the 
activity of its makers. A Vermeer and a perfectly executed copy may 
have exactly the same appearance in the sense that one could not 
identify the copy simply by comparing their surfaces. But they are not 
the same aesthetically; we are sensitive to the fact that the 
appearance of the one is a trace of forms of activity not exemplified in 
the production of the other. Vermeer made compositional choices not 
open to the copyist, exhibiting talents not disclosed by the copyist’s 
product.6 There may be occasions on which, or people for whom, the 
manifestation of copying skills are more important than creativity in 
composition. The point still holds: what we value aesthetically we 
value at least in part for its manifestation of qualities in the maker.7  
Does that mean that the Vermeer and the copy do not, after all, look 
the same, at least when we understand their background differences? 
The question raises complex issues about what properties of things 
are represented in perception.8 Because we are not committed to the 
view that what is appreciated aesthetically is available in perception 
alone—the perception-only view—we don’t need to take a stand on 
that issue. Those who hold the perception-only view must opt for 
some version of the idea that what is visually represented goes beyond 
the “low level” properties of shape, colour, size and movement. The 
other option is to say that vision, strictly conceived, encompasses just 
those low level properties, and that aesthetic sensibility is not limited 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(ed) Aesthetic Science, Oxford University Press; for a convergent assessment see Sam 
Rose, The Fear of Aesthetics in Art and Literary Theory, New Literary History, 48, 
2017: 223-244.  
5 See Kendall Walton, Categories of Art, Philosophical Review, 1970, for a classic 
statement of this rejection.  
6  There are aspects of our comparative valuing of these pictures—particularly 
financial valuing—which reflect factors other than their values as traces. But trace-
value is one important factor. 
7  This relation to the perception of skill is widely recognised in the aesthetics 
literature. Frank Sibley noted that “as we come to realize how boldly or subtly, with 
what skill, economy, and exactness, the effect is achieved, how each detail is judged 
to a nicety and all work together with a fine precision, our appreciation is deepened 
and enriched” (Approaches to Aesthetics, Oxford University Press, 2001, p.37; from a 
paper first published in 1965). Kendall Walton says “…the reader may also 
appreciate, he may admire with pleasure, the poet's perceptiveness and 
insightfulness and her skill in presenting profound truths in a vivid and convincing 
manner. Then the reader's enjoyment is (in part at least) aesthetic.” (How Marvelous! 
Toward a Theory of Aesthetic Value, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 51 
(1993), pp. 499-510 p.55); Stephen Davies says “recognition of the beauty distinctive 
to a representation might be inseparable from an appreciation of the techniques of 
depiction” (Aesthetic Judgements, Artworks and Functional Beauty, Philosophical 
Quarterly (2006), 56, No. 223: 224-241 pp.235-6). Denis Dutton, Artistic Crimes: the 
problem of forgery in the arts, British Journal of Aesthetics, 19 (1979): 302-314 is a 
systematic and influential statement of this sort of view. 
8  Grace Helton’s recent Issues in High-Level Perception, Philosophy Compass 11 
(12):851-862 (2016) is a review of this fast-moving field.  
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to perceptual experience though it may require it.9 Neither view is 
intrinsically improbable. As regards perception, all we need to insist 
on at this stage is that the aesthetically relevant features of a work do 
not supervene on its perceptual features narrowly conceived: shape, 
colour, size and movement. 
We start from the idea that artefacts display, through their aesthetic 
properties, the skills, sensibilities and sometimes personality traits 
that contributed to the fashioning of those very properties. Our 
intensely social evolution has made us exquisitely sensitive to 
properties of these kinds, and their manifestation in artefacts creates 
and sustains powerful affective and cognitive relations (including the 
good will noted by Alberti) between observers and makers. These 
relations are in turn highly explanatory of the ways people value art 
works and aesthetically charged things.10  
The claim is not a merely conjunctive one: not just that we delight in 
the aesthetics of appearances and value the skill that went into 
fashioning those appearances. Rather, how an artefact is seen as 
aesthetically delightful and/or valuable is affected by the skills and 
other qualities it manifests. We label this idea aesthetics as the 
manifestation of personal qualities, or Manifestation, or sometimes 
simply M.  
M is not meant as a piece of conceptual analysis. Perhaps we 
sometimes take a narrowly perceptual, uncontextualized pleasure in 
an object’s appearance; there might be creatures for whom this is all 
the pleasure perceptual experience provides. We are happy for such 
pleasures to count as aesthetic and are less interested in what is 
essential to the aesthetic than what is important for it. Edward Craig 
points out that something can be deeply illuminating of a practice, 
without being a necessary or sufficient condition for its occurrence.11 
While M may not be a universal of aesthetic experience it is 
exemplified well beyond the Western art canon. Hand-made artefacts 
of all kinds may be visually indistinguishable from machine-made 
ones, but rarely have the same aesthetic appeal. And work in 
empirical psychology supports the idea that artefacts generally are 
understood to have an interest and value that depends as much on 
the performance of the maker as on the appearance or functionality of 
the product.12 In many languages aesthetic predicates often apply to 
                                                             
9 See e.g. A. Nehamas, Only a Promise of Happiness, Princeton 2007, especially 94. 
10 See Greg Currie, Pictures and their Surfaces, in J. Pelletier & A. Voltolini (eds) The 
Pleasure of Pictures, Abingdon, Routledge, 2019. People can exercise tremendous 
skills and creative abilities to ends we think are not aesthetically worthwhile. If we 
do think that, it is likely that we take the work to manifest some failure of 
sensibility.  
11  Knowledge and the State of Nature: An Essay in Conceptual Synthesis. Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1991. 
12 See Newman, G. E., & Bloom, P. (2011). Art and Authenticity: The Importance of 
Originals in Judgments of Value. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General. doi: 
10.1037/a0026035; Cho, H., & Schwarz, N. (2008). Of great art and untalented 
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both the activity and the result; as a commentator on Yorùbá carving 
and its terminology says “dídán denotes not only the beautiful 
"luminosity" of surface but also the sculptor's painstaking final 
procedure of "polishing" the object. The resulting object is the palpable 
index of the care that went into its manufacture”.13 We might also 
look to the Italian Renaissance: for Vasari, grace in a picture is the 
manifestation of the artist’s graceful performance.14 
These examples prove little of course. We need detailed historical and 
cross-cultural studies to gauge the proper significance of M. As a 
contribution to that project we examine a practice of the distant past: 
Acheulian tool manufacture. We make a suggestion about what 
brought our distant ancestors to the point where they began, 
systematically and self-consciously, to experience artefacts in ways 
that exemplify M. Accordingly, Section 2 turns away from philosophy 
to that deep evolutionary past, and to why ancient stone tools are 
such rich sources of knowledge about the cognitive and social lives of 
our distant ancestors. Section 3 outlines how M was exemplified in 
Early Stone Age culture. Section 4 gathers evidence from diverse 
sources to support that claim, while keeping in view the limits on our 
explanatory capacities; however upbeat we may be about the 
evidential value of stone tools, however optimistic we are about the 
prospects for the historical sciences, there’s no disguising these 
speculations as established fact. 15  Section 5 returns us to more 
philosophical territory, arguing that our narrative supports the idea 
that Acheulian agents were aesthetic agents; it even attempts what 
will seem an absurd comparison, between the Acheulian and the 
Quattrocento. In making it we hope to display some hidden richness in 
what counts as an aesthetic response to an artefact. Section 6 
speculates briefly and inconclusively on how the forces of biology and 
culture may have helped make M a regular feature of human 
experience. 
 
2. The role of Acheulian tools in cognitive archaeology 
The oldest artefacts likely to excite our aesthetic interest are the 
Acheulian handaxes and other stone tools, sometimes of remarkable 
                                                                                                                                                                              
artists: Effort information and the flexible construction of judgmental heuristics. 
Journal of Consumer Psychology, 18, 205–211. doi:10.1016/j.jcps.2008.04.009. 
13David Doris, Symptoms and Strangeness in Yorùbá Anti-aesthetics, African Arts. 
2005. Vol. 38: 24, 9.  
14 Lives of the Painters, Sculptors and Architects, enlarged edition, 1568 (Trs Gaston 
Du C, de Vere, Everyman Library, J.M.Dent & Sons Ltd, 1980). Vasari’s constant 
theme is what the work tells of its making: works are made diligently, gracefully, the 
maker endowing the stone “with the attributes of living flesh”, some works showing 
“much grace, … made with beautiful proportion” or having “excellence of invention, 
grace and manner”, others “so grossly made, and in such a rough style, that it is 
impossible to imagine worse”. For commentary see Anthony Blunt, Artistic Theory in 
Italy 1450-1600, Oxford University Press, especially pp.95-100. 
15 For optimism about the historical sciences see Adrian Currie, Rock, Bone and 
Ruin.  MIT Press, 2017. 
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workmanship, elegance and symmetry. Some go back to 1.75 million 
years ago (mya), though the more obviously interesting ones are said 
to be mostly in the period from about 0.7mya—the Late Acheulian.16 
Of this industry Wynn and Gowlett say: 
…the shape of an Acheulian handaxe was often “over-
determined”: that is, the maker gave more attention and effort to 
producing the shape than was necessary for basic… 
functionality, similar to the ornamental flourishes modern 
armorers add to ceremonial swords.17 
 
 
Figure 1. Handaxe from Olduvai Gorge Bed II, Tanzania, about 1.4 million years old. By kind permission 
of Professor Thomas Wynn. 
 
Figure 2. Handaxe from Kathu Pan, South Africa, about 500,000 years old.  A very exceptional piece. By 
kind permission of Professor Thomas Wynn. 
 
                                                             
16 According to some commentators, the early Acheulian shows, in some places, a 
pattern of increased refinement of making through time: “Comparing the Konso 
handaxe assemblages of ∼1.75, ∼1.6, and ∼1.25 Ma, a clear increase of 
workmanship can be seen in edge modification and tip thinning” (Yonas Beyene, et. 
al, The characteristics and chronology of the earliest Acheulian at Konso, Ethiopia, 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences Jan 2013, 110 (5) 1584-
1591; DOI:10.1073/pnas.1221285110 
17  Wynn T, & Gowlett J., The handaxe reconsidered. Evolutionary 
Anthropology, 2018 27(1):21-29. doi: 10.1002/evan.21552. On the relation between 
shape and functionality in handaxes see Key, Alastair JM, and Stephen J. Lycett. 
Influence of handaxe size and shape on cutting efficiency: a large-scale experiment 
and morphometric analysis. Journal of Archaeological Method and Theory 24.2 
(2017): 514-541. 2; see also Machin, Anna J., Robert T. Hosfield, and Steven J. 
Mithen. Why are some handaxes symmetrical? Testing the influence of handaxe 
morphology on butchery effectiveness. Journal of Archaeological Science 34.6 (2007).  
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It is these “ornamental flourishes” that will concern us. Over-
determination in the Acheulean industry has long been noted and the 
idea of an aesthetic component to it is now gaining some traction in 
archaeological circles.18 Often this is dealt with under such headings 
as “perceptual bias”, “peak shift”, or “perceptual ambiguity”, the 
assumption being that what aesthetics adds to the explanatory mix is 
the idea that functional artefacts may be reshaped by arbitrary 
preferences for certain perceptual forms.19 In conformity with Section 
1, we say this is too thin an account of the aesthetic. Aesthetic 
elaboration has an important social function, the operation of which is 
no more separable from the attractions of an object’s form than the 
aesthetic effect of a Renaissance painting is separable from one’s 
awareness of the maker’s skills and sensibilities manifested in it.   
Because of their robust material constitution, we know a good deal 
about the making of these objects. Their surfaces provide a literal 
blow by blow account of how they were constructed; the removal of 
final flakes leaves a scar on the remainder, and earlier stages in the 
reduction process can often be reconstructed by piecing together the 
on-site debitage. Flakes were removed in order then to remove further 
flakes and analysis suggest that makers followed a tree structure of 
actions: for the more complex and refined items a hierarchy of ten 
nested levels has been proposed.20 We are even able to reproduce the 
process of making through the work of modern “expert knappers” 
whose brain activities have been carefully recorded. Acheulean tools 
are an extraordinarily valuable window into aspects of the mental and 
physical capacities of people of several ancestor species: probably 
Homo ergaster and Homo heidelbergensis; possibly Homo habilis.  
When it comes to cognitive archaeology, hand axes are the artefacts 
that keep on giving. They suggest a great deal about the social 
organisation of the agents who made them; as we shall see, this sheds 
important light on the question why these objects are sometimes over-
determined, as Wynn and Gowlett put it. Peter Hiscock has reviewed 
the evidence for a sophisticated sensitivity to the economics of tool 
making even in the Oldowan technology which preceded the 
Acheulean: particular materials were preferred to lower quality but 
closer supplies, and were transported over significant distances.21 The 
record of caching of raw materials at this early period indicates a 
detailed knowledge, socially transmitted, of the material properties of 
                                                             
18 See the excellently illustrated volume First Sculpture, edited by Tony Berlant and 
Thomas Wynn, Nasher Sculpture Centre, Dallas, Texas, 2018, with commentaries 
by Gowlett, Wynn and others.  
19  See commentary by Berlant and Wynn (p.26, 51, 73, 92, 118) and by V. S. 
Ramachandran (p.69) in First Sculpture. Certainly, perceptual biases have their part 
to play in explaining the specific forms that human aesthetic experience takes; see 
Greg Currie, The Master of the Masek Beds, in E. Schellekens and P. Goldie (eds) 
The Aesthetic Mind. Oxford University Press, 2011, Section 6. 
20 Stout D. 2011. Stone toolmaking and the evolution of human culture and 
cognition. Phil. Trans. R. Soc. B 366, 1050–1059.   
21Hiscock, Learning in lithic landscapes, Biological Theory 9.1 (2014): 27-41. 
7 
 
lithic resources and their locations across a wide area, as well as of 
the related location of food sources and predators. Caching practices 
further indicate forward planning and a high degree of cooperation, 
with materials transported and stored ahead of use. What, then, does 
the process of tool manufacture suggests concerning interpersonal 
relations within lithic cultures? 
 
3. Learning the trade 
Stone reduction in a systematic way is a complex process that 
requires both planning and flexible and skilful responses to a range of 
ways the materials can respond. 22  The process is also inherently 
dangerous, given flying debris and an absence of medical treatment; 
these dangers reduce significantly with increased skill in making. 
Because each blow comes with the risk of both ruinous fracturing of 
material and injury to the maker there is pressure to make the 
reduction process as economical as possible, which in turn requires a 
plan—a “lithic narrative” as Hiscock puts it—tailored to the needs of 
each individual piece. The return to increments of skill in lithic 
industries is significant, and the skills involved are complex enough to 
demand instruction within something that has come to be called an 
“apprentice system”.  
The idea of lithic apprenticeships is not merely that novices copied the 
behaviours of skilled knappers. Observation of the action of a fast-
working knapper provides little useful instruction; one needs to 
understand how specific actions are responses both to the overall plan 
for the piece (the lithic narrative) and to the moment-by-moment 
problems thrown up by idiosyncrasies of the material and unpredicted 
outcomes of blows. The claim is that gaining the relevant skills in a 
practical time and without high risk of injury required instruction.23 
Hiscock suggests that that this was given with the aid of “gestural 
language”. 24  On independent grounds, Wynn and colleagues argue 
that Acheulian makers possessed a kind of expertise which, in 
modern populations, requires possession of organised semantic 
categories. They conclude that “knappers had declarative/semantic 
labels for these concepts, either in the form of vocal words or perhaps 
                                                             
22 See Dietrich Stout & Nada Khreisheh, Skill learning and human brain evolution: 
an experimental approach, Cambridge Archaeological Journal, 25, Issue 4, 2015: 
867-875; Thierry Chaminade, Erin E Hecht, Bruce Bradley & Dietrich Stout, 
Cognitive Demands of Lower Paleolithic Toolmaking, PLoS ONE DOI: 
10.1371/journal.pone.0121804. 
23 Morgan, T. J. H. et al. Experimental evidence for the co-evolution of hominin 
tool-making, teaching and language. Nature Communications. 6:6029 doi: 
10.1038/ncomms7029 (2015).  
24 Hiscock ibid, 35. See also Sterelny, Language, gesture, skill: the co-evolutionary 
foundations of language, Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci. 2012; 367(1599): 2141–
2151, doi:  10.1098/rstb.2012.0116. But a case against the development of complex 
gestural language is made in Elizabeth Irvine, Method and Evidence: Gesture and 
Iconicity in the Evolution of Language, Mind & Language, https://doi-
org.libproxy.york.ac.uk/10.1111/mila.12102.  
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gestures (we favour the former)”. 25  There is therefore some 
convergence towards the idea of Acheulian agents possessing quasi-
linguistic resources to support the learning process.  
The picture emerging is this. Lithic culture, through and perhaps even 
before the Acheulian, displays signs of complex planning, co-operation 
and cultural learning: assisted learning that uses cognitive processes, 
such as imitation and teaching, which enhance the fidelity of 
information transfer.26 Given the importance of the skills involved, the 
benefits of possessing them, and the cost to teachers in time and 
effort of providing them, learning opportunities may not have been 
freely available. Learners gravitated to those with evident skills, who 
could then expect to gain through returns of provisioning, co-
operation and deference. Teachers competed by signalling their own 
(highest) levels of skill through public acts of tool production. The 
advantages of displaying stand-out levels of skills led to the 
production of artefacts which significantly exceeded the requirements 
of ordinary use. To help draw attention to the enhanced 
workmanship, these items were often made salient in various ways: 
they might employ less common, hard to work and perceptually 
pleasing materials, display high levels of symmetry, as well sometimes 
as artful violations of symmetry, careful retention of a fossil or other 
embedded object, be of large (or notably small) size and with finely 
worked tips.27 Given that these were exercises in advertisement rather 
than practical projects, it did not matter that their display-function 
sometimes compromised or even negated their usefulness.  
To the extent that acquiring these skills conferred advantages on 
learners, the capacity to discriminate highly skilled teachers was itself 
an advantage, sharpening the competition by making learners better 
informed about, and more rationally responsive to, the quality of the 
signal. As skill levels increased among makers, the power to detect the 
ways in which genuinely skilful making is manifested increased also. 
                                                             
25See G. Herzlinger, T. Wynn & N. Goren-Inbar, 2017. Expert cognition in the 
production sequence of Acheulian cleavers at Gesher Benot Ya'aqov, Israel: A lithic 
and cognitive analysis, Plos One, 12.11, p. e0188337. 
26  See C. Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets: the cultural evolution of thinking, Harvard 
University Press, 2018, p.86. 
27  Some authorities have suggested that there is a bias towards reporting 
symmetrical hand axes; James Cole (Examining the Presence of Symmetry within 
Acheulian Handaxes: A Case Study in the British Palaeolithic, Cambridge 
Archaeological Journal, 25 (2015): 713-732) says, on the basis of an examination of 
2680 bifaces from seven sites, “symmetrical bifaces do not appear to have a 
particularly strong presence in any assemblage and do not appear to increase as 
time progress” But White and Foulds (Symmetry is its own reward: on the character 
and significance of Acheulian handaxe symmetry in the Middle Pleistocene, 
Antiquity, 92 (2018): 304-319), while finding a degree of reporting bias, conclude 
that at Middle Palaeolithic sites in Britain, “the majority of handaxes are highly 
symmetrical or better” (p.308). Unlike Cole, they use automated measures of 
symmetry rather than observer judgements. The latter method seems precarious 
because our intuitive standards of symmetry, derived from constant experience with 
machine-made items, might be quite different from those prevailing in the 
Acheulian.  
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In such an environment a capacity to respond to—and especially to 
produce—artefacts which manifest in striking ways the qualities that 
went into their making would be very useful. In this we see early—
perhaps the earliest—signs in our lineage of an aesthetic sensibility of 
the kind that concerns us here. Section 6 returns to this claim. But so 
far we have only a story. What does the evidence say?                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
 
4. Learning and teaching in the Acheulian: theory and 
evidence 
One likely objection to the story is that it depends on an exaggerated 
picture of the role of teaching in Early Stone Age communities. After 
all, current evidence from hunter-gatherer societies indicates that 
episodes of teaching are rare. So it is said. 
Before we look at the available evidence it must be said that the 
potential for evidence of current teaching to support the proposal is 
limited; modern hunter gatherer societies are populated by modern 
humans and Acheulean societies were not, and there are many ways 
the two populations are cognitively and behaviourally distinct. On the 
same ground, a demonstrable or probable absence of teaching in 
modern hunter-gatherer societies would tell significantly against the 
proposal: if we don’t find teaching in modern hunter-gatherer 
societies, what chance is there that such a cognitively demanding 
activity was found in communities which, despite some likely 
structural similarities, were populated by cognitively much more 
limited agents with correspondingly limited means of communication? 
In the light of this the best one can hope for is weak evidence for the 
proposal, and the avoidance of strong evidence against it. And that is 
what we have.  
Weak, perhaps very weak, evidence would be a bad outcome from our 
point of view would it not? Not so bad in the circumstances. If 
teaching among modern hunter-gatherers was the only reason we had 
for believing in teaching in the Acheulian, the hypothesis would not be 
very credible. But we do have another reason for believing this: the 
intrinsic difficulty of acquiring the complex lithic skills described 
above without teaching. In developing their theoretical model of the 
evolution of teaching Fogarty et. al. say that “cumulative cultural 
evolution allows complex, high fitness traits that no individual could 
acquire on his or her own or through inadvertent social learning, 
ranging from ancestral lithic technology, tools and weaponry through 
to contemporary technology, to be present and available to teach in 
human populations.”28 Tehrani and Riede say that “Even armed with 
a highly sophisticated set of imitative abilities, it is difficult to imagine 
how a novice could… achieve the delicately calibrated balance 
between precision and power exercised by a master stone knapper, 
                                                             
28 Fogarty, L., Strimling, P. & Laland, K, The evolution of teaching, Evolution 65-10: 
2760–2770, p.322.   
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just by repeated observation.” They add that “it seems highly probable 
that teaching has been an important mechanism of material culture 
transmission since at least the Lower Palaeolithic, when the first 
complex lithic forms emerged.”29  
For all this it would be of concern if it turned out that in the only 
societies we can now meaningfully compare with the Acheulian there 
is no evidence of teaching. In disputing this, as we shall, our hope is 
not that evidence of teaching in modern hunter-gatherer societies will 
raise the probability of the hypothesis very high, but rather that, by 
protecting it from a substantially undermining counter-argument, it 
will prevent it from falling very low.  
Our story’s potential for confirmation is limited in two other ways. 
First of all, much of the current evidence of teaching in hunter-
gatherer societies concerns processes of child-learning. Despite 
denials from some investigators, there is evidence of child-teaching in 
hunter-gatherer societies, once we abandon the idea that this requires 
an institutionalised setting. 30  However, evidence of this kind is 
problematic from our point of view for two reasons: (i) it is unlikely 
that very young people in the Acheulean would have been taught the 
skills of lithic tool manufacture, given the strength and dexterity 
required, and (ii) inferences concerning children from modern hunter-
gatherer societies to those of the Acheulian are particularly precarious 
on the assumption that the length of childhood has increased 
dramatically between these times. For our purposes, better evidence 
would be of teaching in adolescence and early adulthood, especially 
given that, on the present hypothesis, learners played an active part 
in choosing teachers.   
                                                             
29Jamshid J. Tehrani & Felix Riede (2008) Towards an archaeology of pedagogy: 
learning, teaching and the generation of material culture traditions, World 
Archaeology, 40:3, 316-331, DOI: 10.1080/00438240802261267, p.318. Indeed 
there is evidence of copying errors in the archaeological record, adding support to 
the idea that the reproduction of tool-making techniques was intrinsically difficult; 
see Stephen J. Lycett, Kerstin Schillinger, Metin I. Eren  & Alex Mesoudi, Factors 
affecting Acheulean handaxe variation: Experimental insights, microevolutionary 
processes, and macroevolutionary outcomes, Quaternary International, 411, Part B, 
2016: 386-401. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.quaint.2015.08.0 and Ceri 
Shipton, Chris Clarkson & Rommy Cobden, Were Acheulean Bifaces Deliberately 
Made Symmetrical? Archaeological and Experimental Evidence, Cambridge 
Archaeological Journal,  29,  2019: 65-79, 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S095977431800032X. 
30 Evidence cited by Csibra and Gergely comes from the Aka in West Africa, where 
“[p]eople reported that they had learnt most (80%) of their skills from their parents, 
often by teaching” (citing Hewlett B., Cavalli-Sforza L. L. 1986. Cultural 
transmission among Aka pygmies. American Anthropologist, 88, 922–
93410.1525/aa.1986.88.4.02a00100 (doi:10.1525/aa.1986.88.4.02a00100) and 
(citing Lancy D. F. 1996. Playing on the mother-ground: cultural routines for children's 
development. New York, NY: Guilford Press) the Kpelle in Liberia: “knowledgeable 
adults teach their children about medicines (p. 68) and board games (p. 116), give 
advice about making traps (p. 146), guide children's hands when learning how to 
weave a bag (pp. 151–152) and demonstrate how to make a hammock (p. 154).  
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Secondly, a good deal of evidence of teaching beyond childhood is 
related to the inculcation of what are called “Cultural Values and 
Kinship” and “Religious Beliefs and Practices”.31 Evidence of teaching 
of this kind, which often involves story-telling, would not be good 
evidence of the kind of close, practice-based teaching required for 
passing on lithic skills. 32   While some things relevant to lithic 
manufacture such as resource location might be conveyed in narrative 
form, lithic skills are, as emphasised above, highly dependent on 
competence with the idiosyncrasy of materials.33 Nor can we assume 
that Acheulean agents had a language that would bear the weight of 
story-telling.  
So our focus is on skills-based teaching of maturing and mature 
agents in hunter-gatherer societies. Particularly relevant is the 
inculcation of hunting skills which are complex, and not taught until 
adolescence. For this there certainly is evidence. Dira and Hewlett 
studied hunting among the Chabu people and found that verbal 
instruction was the most common form for teaching these skills; also, 
Chabu adolescents were able to choose between teachers. 34  More 
generally, Boyette and Hewlett report that direct instruction is used 
most often in the domains of complex ecological knowledge or 
subsistence skills, of which stone tool making is one.35 On a more 
personal note Bonnie Hewlett recounts her experience of learning 
basket weaving from women of the Aka people. It involved 
demonstration, instruction and correction over three weeks for many 
hours at a time and apparently did not seem odd or difficult to those 
supplying it.36 
                                                             
31 See Garfield, Z., M. Garfield, and B.S. Hewlett. 2016. A cross-cultural analysis of 
hunter-gatherer social learning. In Social learning and Innovation in contemporary 
hunter-gatherers: Evolutionary and ethnographic perspectives, ed. H. Terashima and 
B.S. Hewlett, 19–34. Tokyo: Springer Japan.  
32  Cultural and religious teaching often takes the form of story-narration; see 
Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Oral Storytelling as Evidence of Pedagogy in Forager 
Societies, Frontiers of Psychology, 29 March 2017; 
https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00471. 
33See D. Stout, Skill and Cognition in Stone Tool Production, Current Anthropology 
Volume 43, Number 5, December 2002: “Individuals interviewed indicated that 
finding high-quality material is one of the most difficult and important aspects of 
adze production” (p.696); “Craftsmen who happen to be in the immediate area 
gather to discuss the merits of the selected boulder, commenting on the size and 
uniformity of the grain, the danger of internal flaws (ismar), and the presence of 
black (bataya) or white (boladiatenga, “deepskin belt”) mineral bands…. Although 
they realize that these bands often represent points of weakness in the rock, the 
adze makers prize them for their aesthetic value” (697). 
34 Dira, S.J. & Hewlett, B. S. 2016. Learning to spear hunt among Ethiopian Chabu 
adolescent hunter-gatherers. In H. Terashima, & B. S. Hewlett (eds) Social learning 
and innovation in contemporary hunter-gatherers: evolutionary and ethnographic 
perspectives. Japan: Springer: pp.71–81. 
35A. H. Boyette & B. S. Hewlett, Teaching in Hunter-Gatherers, Review of Philosophy 
& Psychology, 2017, DOI 10.1007/s13164-017-0347-2 
36Hewlett, B. L. (2013). Listen, here is a story. New York: Oxford University Press. 
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The best evidence for our story would be from the modern 
transmission of lithic skills. There are few contemporary communities 
where stone tool manufacture continues but detailed ethnographic 
evidence from a village in what is now Papua Province documents an 
apprenticeship system that can last ten years aimed at producing the 
long and slender ads heads used in this agricultural (rather than 
hunter-gatherer) community. Traditionally, apprenticeship here began 
around the age of 12–13. With the availability of industrially made 
tools demand has declined and interest in the skill seems now to be 
connected with the perceived value of tradition; apprentices are more 
often in their twenties.37  
The vast temporal distance between the Acheulian and now makes 
retrodiction hazardous. But there is, finally, some evidence of teaching 
in at least the Upper Palaeolithic. Using analysis of the operator chain 
at Magdalenian sites, Pigeot claims to have reconstructed evidence for 
an apprenticeship system. 38  Similar inferences have been made 
concerning later Palaeolithic sites such as Trollesgave, eastern 
Denmark where Fischer argues for a ‘school of flintknapping’.39 Kim 
Sterelny cites a study by Linda Grimm according to which “some cores 
show evidence of being largely made by inexpert knappers, but from 
blanks provided by experts, and with occasional expert 
intervention”.40 
After this presentation of theory and evidence we turn to an 
interpretive question that needs a good deal of philosophical 
structuring: to what extent is the Acheulian an aesthetic culture?  
 
5. Aesthetic sensibility  
Does the story so far support the attribution of aesthetic sensitivity to 
Acheulian agents? Aesthetic sensitivity comes in degrees and we 
should avoid a very demanding conception of what such sensitivity 
amounts to, or one keyed to the idiosyncrasies of art in the twenty-
                                                             
37“It is quite common, for example, for one man to make suggestions to another 
about where to attempt the next flake removal or to comment on the quality of the 
material being worked. Similarly, a worker who is experiencing difficulties may ask 
another to try his hand at the task. Such interaction occurs between peers but is 
most frequent between experts and apprentices” (D. Stout, Skill and Cognition in 
Stone Tool Production, Current Anthropology, 43, (2002), 703).  
38  Pigeot, N. 1990. Technical and social actors: flintknapping specialists at 
Magdalenian Etiolles. Archaeological Review from Cambridge, 9: 126–41. 
39  Fischer, A. 1989. A Late Palaeolithic ‘school’ of flint-knapping at Trollesgave, 
Denmark: results from refitting. Acta Archaeologica, 60: 33–49. Evidence from Upper 
Palaeolithic sites is summarised in Jamshid J. Tehrani & Felix Riede (2008) Towards 
an archaeology of pedagogy: learning, teaching and the generation of material 
culture traditions, World Archaeology, 40:3, 316-331, DOI: 
10.1080/00438240802261267, p.318, p.322-324.  
40 Kim Sterelny, The Evolved Apprentice: How Evolution Made Humans Unique, MIT 
Press, 2012., p.42, citing Grimm, L. 2000. Apprentice flintknapping: Relating 
material culture and social practice in the Upper Palaeolithic. In Children and 
Material Culture, ed. Joanna Safaer Derevenski, 53 – 71. New York: Routledge. 
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first century. We should not require Acheulian agents to have a 
concept of the aesthetic, just as we don’t need to attribute a concept of 
sex to agents who look for sexual partners.41 We should not require 
that Acheulian agents have some uniquely “aesthetic” experience: 
attempts to specify such a thing for humans has been one of the 
failures of modern aesthetics. We can assume instead that aesthetic 
experience was as heterogeneous for them as it seems to be for us. We 
should not require that Acheulian agents engaged in conscious 
reasoning about the aesthetic qualities of their artefacts; few of us do 
that. All we need say is that these agents were apt to take pleasure in 
the sensory qualities these objects presented (primarily visual but 
possibly tactile as well), where that pleasure is modulated by 
awareness of the ways those sensory qualities manifest the skills 
exercised in their production. Again, this modulation need not 
function by way of reasoning; we need only attribute to these agents a 
primitive capacity to “see” skilful making in these objects just as we 
“see” personal qualities, from simple fearfulness to resoluteness, in 
the demeanours and actions of our fellows. Our scare quotes recall 
what we previously granted: that neither of these cases need be 
literally a matter of seeing; an austere theory of perceptual 
representation may be true. But if we do not literally see fearfulness or 
dignity we often do not reason our way to them; we find ourselves 
recognising the agent as fearful in a way that makes talk of seeing 
these things very natural.  We sometimes recognise in the same 
visually guided and mandatory way the skilfulness manifested in an 
artefact, though it may take experience and background knowledge to 
get us to that point. A pleasure taken in form-as-indicative-of-skilful-
making is all we require to support the very modest levels of aesthetic 
sensibility we are attributing to Acheulian subjects. Later in this 
section we will suggest an enrichment to this minimalist account of 
the aesthetic: one which is certainly present in historical times and 
may have been present in the Acheulian. 
An objection to the minimal aesthetic is that Acheulian agents 
regarded the appearances of lithic artefacts instrumentally, that is, as 
useful indicators of skills, whereas aesthetically sensitive agents 
derive satisfaction from the appearances of things “for themselves”, as 
we say. But what is enjoyed “for itself” may also have substantial 
instrumental value, where that instrumental value is a precondition of 
any attribution of “final” value. Christine Korsgaard says 
A mink coat can be valued the way we value things for their own 
sakes: a person might put it on a list of the things he always 
wanted, or aspire to have some day, right alongside adventure, 
travel, or peace of mind. Yet it is also odd to say it is valued 
                                                             
41Domenic McIver Lopes argues, rightly, that there are artistic communities with no 
concept of art (Art Without ‘Art’, The British Journal of Aesthetics, 47 (2007): 1–15, 
https://doi-org.libproxy.york.ac.uk/10.1093/aesthj/ayl035); not that we are 
arguing that the Acheulian was an artistic community—see this section further on.  
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simply for its own sake. A coat is essentially instrumental: were 
it not for the ways in which human beings respond to cold, we 
would not care about them or ever think about them…. Mink 
coats… are things that human beings might choose partly for 
their own sakes under the condition of their instrumentality: 
that is, given the role such things play in our lives.42  
In the same way we may concede that hand axes are essentially 
instrumental and that their significance for Acheulian agents depends 
on the nexus of transactions they facilitate, be they episodes of meat-
extraction or of skill-signalling. Yet, under these “conditions of 
instrumentality” they, or their appearances, may be admired “for their 
own sakes”.   
In the same place Korsgaard makes a related and important point, 
though one which subsequent commentators have sought to amend.43 
For our purposes we need say only the following. We may think of 
something as having value merely as an instrument that helps us 
achieve something else which is (let’s suppose) of final value. But if we 
think of it as having final value there is a tendency to assume that its 
value must be intrinsic, or “in itself”—value that does not depend on 
any other thing. Contrapositively, if we think a thing’s value does 
depend on something else—it has, we may say, extrinsic value—then 
we think of its value as instrumental. In line with this way of thinking 
one might hear what was said at the beginning of this paper and 
respond: “So the focus of our aesthetic interests, the thing we are 
attributing aesthetic value to, is not really the artefact but the agent 
who made it; it is the agent’s qualities that we really care about. That 
is what is intrinsically valuable; the artefact is valuable in so far as it 
makes those qualities manifest”.  
This line of thinking is mistaken. The value a painting has may 
depend (in part) on it bearing the manifestation relation to its maker; 
to say that is to agree that the value the painting has is extrinsic. It is 
not to say that the painting has value merely as a means to the 
identification of the maker and their qualities. Likewise, one may 
value a wedding ring only because of its connection with a wedding, 
but it does not follow that one values it only instrumentally. 44 
Nicholas Humphrey, writing about aesthetics’ evolutionary past, 
rightly says that  
…we value the work of art only when we see the human hand 
behind it. We marvel at the cave paintings at Lascaux, for 
example, only because we believe they were made by artists. If it 
                                                             
42 Two distinctions in goodness, Philosophical Review, 1983, p.185. 
43 See e.g. Rae Langton (2007), Objective and unconditioned value, Philosophical 
Review 116 (2):157-185; Jonathan Dancy, Ethics without principles, Oxford 
University Press, 2004, Chapter 9.  
44 The example is due to Langton, Objective and unconditioned value, who at this 
point offers an emendation to Korsgaard; we can ignore this.  
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were to turn out these images had been created by accidental 
water stains, they’d become merely quaint.45  
But he also says “We may seem to love beautiful things as if it were 
indeed the thing of beauty in itself that counts for us. But our feeling 
about the thing is always a proxy for our feeling about some idealised 
person in the background.” This mischaracterises our valuing of 
beautiful things: we do value them for themselves. The fact that our 
valuing depends on their relations to a maker should not tempt us to 
deny this. 
In the light of this there is, we suggest, some continuity between the 
Acheulian and more obviously aesthetic cultures like the Quattrocento, 
with their hyper-refined standards. High aesthetic cultures have not 
put aside practical interests; aesthetic production in fifteenth century 
Italy was strongly governed by the social ambitions of patrons, who 
controlled the subject, appearance and materials of the work. 
Aesthetic production was not then driven by the need to co-ordinate 
learners and teachers, since patrons did not generally seek artistic 
skills. But patrons, then as now, were intensely sensitive to the ways 
in which the pictures that interested them manifested skills of 
making. As Baxandall says, “[the patron] was aware that the good 
picture embodied skill and he was frequently assured that it was the 
part of the cultivated beholder to make discriminations about that 
skill”. 46   Baxandall’s focus is securely on the picture as site of 
transaction between maker and viewer, emphasising the skills 
necessary properly to discriminate and assess the skills embodied in 
the picture, and how the exercise of these skills contributes to the 
pleasure that pictures afford: “If a painting gives us opportunity for 
exercising a valued skill and rewards our virtuosity with a sense of 
worthwhile insights into that painting’s organisation, we tend to enjoy 
it”. This suggests a further step, one that Baxandall does not explicitly 
make: to bring within the domain of the aesthetic one’s enjoyment of 
the skills and sensibilities one brings to the task of appreciating those 
(different) skills and sensibilities manifested in the work. Kendall 
Walton, in the process of outlining a theory of aesthetic pleasure, is 
tempted by this idea: “As a first stab, let's define aesthetic pleasure as 
pleasure which has, as a component, pleasure taken in one's 
admiration or positive evaluation of something”.47 But he draws back 
from this formulation: 
A person might take pleasure of a self-congratulatory sort in 
admiring something; one might pat oneself on the back, with 
                                                             
45 Beauty’s child, at http://www.humphrey.org.uk/papers/2010Beauty'sChild.pdf. 
This otherwise unpublished essay is impressive and deserves to be read more 
widely. 
46Painting and experience in fifteenth century Italy: a primer in the social history of 
pictorial style. Second edition, Oxford University Press, 1988, p.34.  
47 How marvellous: towards a theory of aesthetic appreciation, Journal of Aesthetics 
and Arts Criticism, 1993, p.505. 
16 
 
delight, for one's sophisticated and subtle taste in recognizing 
the thing's merit. This pleasure would seem not to be aesthetic.48 
We are unsure why a self-congratulatory pleasure cannot be aesthetic 
when other-congratulatory pleasures apparently can be. Calling this 
pleasure “self-congratulatory” suggests that it is indulgent and 
perhaps self-deceptive. No doubt it can be; it might on the other hand 
be entirely realistic. And an appreciation of a picture’s own qualities 
can be indulgent; you fail to see what is wrong with its sentimentality. 
It may even be self-deceptive, having you assign it qualities which you 
in some sense know it lacks. In such a case we would have a defective 
aesthetic response, but still an aesthetic one. The same applies, we 
say, for the self-congratulatory case. Without claiming that pleasure 
taken in the exercise of one’s own discriminatory powers is essential 
to any experience that could be called aesthetic, it is surely a 
frequently important part of what motivates us to struggle, as we 
sometimes do, to understand works with qualities which are difficult 
to discern, and which may require considerable training and 
experience to reveal.49 We do not, and perhaps cannot, know whether 
Acheulian agents experienced this kind of reflexive pleasure—pleasure 
taken in one’s own discernment of the qualities of things. But the 
outline we have given of aesthetic transactions in the Acheulian 
certainly makes room for this. Prospective apprentices needed to see—
to be keen to learn to see—the qualities manifested in the products of 
skilled makers.50 
Where does value come into this? Among aestheticians it’s widely held 
that aesthetic experience is essentially normative; that it is “definitive 
of pleasure in beauty that it licenses judgments that make claim to 
correctness”.51 One might suspect that Acheulean agents lacked such 
a normative conception. However, a recent empirical study across 19 
countries in Asia, Europe, and the Americas failed to find much 
evidence for this normative stance among non-aestheticians; in all 
regions the least favoured response (7% of 2,392 responses overall) to 
a situation where one finds an object beautiful and the other does not 
was “One of you is correct while the other is not”.52 Level of education, 
                                                             
48 Ibid, p.505-6, our emphasis; see also his discussion at pp.507-508. 
49 It may also account for what has been called the vice of snobbery in aesthetic 
appreciation (Matthew Kieran, The vice of snobbery: Aesthetic knowledge, 
justification and virtue in art appreciation, Philosophical Quarterly 60 (239):243-263 
(2010)), and hence be a reason why aesthetic appreciation is rather fragile. 
50  On much we are in agreement with Walton: “An appreciator's enjoyable 
admiration, usually if not always, involves not only recognizing a thing's value—
recognizing the marvelous job it does of opening our eyes to important truths, for 
instance, or how wonderfully suited it is for providing safe and efficient 
transportation; one's admiration also involves recognizing the creator’s 
accomplishment, the talent and skill a person demonstrated by producing 
something with this value.” (p.506).   
51  James Shelley, Aesthetic Judgment, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aesthetic-judgment/#Norm. 
52  Florian Cova, et. al. De Pulchritudine non est Disputandum? A cross‐cultural 
investigation of the alleged intersubjective validity of aesthetic judgment, Mind & 
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exposure to philosophy, and reflective cognitive style were positively 
correlated with the most popular response (52%): “Neither is correct. It 
makes no sense to talk about correctness in this situation.”53 If these 
results are robust it will be hard to argue that folk-aesthetics is 
decisively normative. On the other hand, it would be interesting to see 
how answers would be distributed if the question specifically 
concerned disagreement about what skills and abilities are evident in 
the picture, musical passage, or whatever was in question. Our guess 
is that subjects would in this case be drawn towards some form of 
objectivism in their responses. Without supposing that Acheulian 
agents reflected much or at all on this, our story of learners and 
teachers in the Early Stone Age suggests that their behaviour would 
betray a sensitivity to the possibility of being wrong about what skills 
were manifested on a particular occasion; it is important to the story, 
after all, that being right on this subject gave Acheulian agents an 
advantage in learning.  
While more needs to be said on this complex topic we suggest this as 
a temporary stopping place: if there is a core of objectivity in people’s 
pre-theoretical approach to aesthetic objectivity, it is to be found in 
the ways we judge aesthetic success in terms of the effective 
deployment of skills.  
In this section we compared the Acheulian not merely to an aesthetic 
culture but to one which is paradigmatically artistic: the Quattrocento. 
That was an artistic culture within which aesthetic values were deeply 
embedded, but the two conditions are separable; the rise of anti-
aesthetic art in our own time shows that in one direction, and it has 
always been recognised that many artefacts that give aesthetic 
pleasure—well designed computers, Korsgaard’s “gorgeously enameled 
frying pans”—do not count as art.54 The relations between art and the 
aesthetic are complex and contested: we are not claiming that the 
Acheulian was an artistic culture, and we do not know how one would 
go about deciding whether it was. 
 
6. Evolutionary speculations55 
The Acheulian occupied perhaps a million and a half years of hominin 
evolution. How does our story of the emergence of aesthetic sensibility 
connect with the mechanisms of evolution? These days we have a rich 
menu of explanatory options, from the postulation of a genetically 
determined instinct at one end, through theories that propose 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Language, https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/mila.12210. The 
highest proportion of objectivist responses was found in South and Southeast Asian 
respondents (22.0%).  
53 A third response “Both of you are correct” was favoured by 41%. 
54 Two distinctions, p.185. For the aesthetics of non-art objects and the tendency to 
see art objects as central cases of the aesthetic, see Yukiro Saito, Everyday 
Aesthetics, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, especially pp.13-18. 
55 We are grateful to the editors of this special issue for comments which led to 
substantial changes in this section. 
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mechanisms of gene-culture interaction, to the cultural 
constructivism of Heyes, for whom such distinctively human 
adaptations as imitation, mentalizing and language (hereafter “the 
triad”) arose and stabilised in the culturally determined way that is 
generally agreed for reading/writing.56  Along with most others we 
reject the genetic determinism option. It is harder to be confident as 
between remaining alternatives and in this section our aims are very 
modest; we do no more than (a) clarify how the debate between 
alternatives is best understood by someone interested in the question 
immediately above; (b) point to a domain of inquiry where relevant 
evidence may be found; (c) emphasise the weakness of the currently 
available evidence we know about.  
After genetic determinism, next along the shelf of options is appeal to 
some form of gene-culture interaction, with genetic assimilation a 
currently popular version. Genetic assimilation—a relation of the 
Baldwin effect—is appealed to by Dor, Ginsberg and Jablonka  in 
discussing an aspect of Acheulian culture:   
Genetic assimilation… occurs when a developmentally-induced 
or learned response becomes less dependent on environmental 
induction or on learning. For example, if a million years ago, 
during the teaching of Acheulean tool-making, more efficient 
imitation-learning was beneficial, selection for better imitators 
could lead to the genetic assimilation of genes that facilitate 
vocal and motor imitation.57 
Their suggestion is that the complex demands of Acheulian tool 
making required imitation-learning, and so favoured a degree of 
genetic control “that allowed individuals to put less effort into their 
learning, as long as it did not jeopardize too much other learning 
capacities” (519). We have argued that the complexity of Acheulian 
tools made imitation on its own an ineffective means of skill-
transfer. 58  Acquiring expertise in this area required a suite of 
capacities, including imitation but also the ability to discriminate 
between more and less skilful productions in others. The thought then 
naturally occurs that this too was subject to genetic assimilation.  
This line of argument is rejected by Heyes, who claims that even those 
capacities most likely to be seen as under at least partly genetic 
control—including our triad—are in fact the product of cultural 
change, just as reading and writing are generally thought to be. Heyes’ 
leading argument (she has others) is that “distinctively human 
cognitive mechanisms are tracking targets that move too fast for 
                                                             
56 See Heyes, Cognitive Gadgets, pp.148-151. 
57 Daniel Dor, Simona Ginsburg & Eva Jablonka, (2019) The evolution of cultural 
gadgets, Mind & Language, 34(4) p.524. They go on to note that “genetic assimilation 
is almost always partial, leading to quicker and more efficient context-sensitive 
responses rather than to stimulus-independent ‘instincts” (p.525). David Papineau 
uses to the term “genetic takeover”; see his excellent The Cultural Origins of 
Cognitive Adaptations, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 56:24-25 (2005). 
58 See above, text to notes 28 and 29. 
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genetic evolution”.59 To us, this suggests a too high-level specification 
of the cognitive mechanisms in question. As Roige and Carruthers 
(2019) put it “Although what one needs to learn from one's culture is 
continually shifting, copying the prestigious remains a good strategy; 
although the actions that need to be imitated change, a system that 
fast-maps vision and audition to action remains useful”.60  But we 
can’t here adjudicate this complex issue, with its many strands of 
argument; instead we take a step back and note this dialectical point: 
it is generally agreed that reading/writing is a purely cultural 
phenomenon, so one way to think about the evolution of skills-based 
aesthetic sensibility is to decide whether it is substantially similar to 
reading/writing and substantially dissimilar from the triad. If it is, 
there is a prima facie case for seeing that sensibility as wholly 
cultural; if that sensibility looks significantly like capacities in the 
triad and unlike reading/writing progress will then depend on a 
decision about whether, despite appearances, capacities in the triad 
are really of the same kind as reading/writing.61  
This is another dispute we cannot settle. A useful first step might be 
to ask whether skills-based appreciation shows a developmental 
trajectory that is quick and reliable, something generally regarded as 
distinctive of capacities in the triad. As far as we can see, the question 
has never been raised in the developmental literature and even 
indirect evidence is thin on the ground. An obvious place to look is 
studies of children’s responses to art and we will note one study of 
this kind. Nissel, Hawley-Dolan & Winner (2014) examined the 
responses of children to abstract pictures made by two groups: firstly, 
famous artists such as Hofmann, Frankenthaler and Rothko, and 
secondly, children and animals. They presented 4-7-year olds and 8-
10-year olds with paired images, and asked which the children 
preferred and which was better. An earlier study (Hawley-Dolan and 
Winner 2011) presented pictures by artists paired with pictures by 
children or animals to adults with no background in art; they were 
asked which they liked more and which were of better quality. Some 
pairs were unlabelled while others had either true or reversed labels 
(artist and child, monkey, elephant). In all cases, adults preferred and 
judged as better the works by the artists. Interestingly, their 
justifications for claims of quality significantly involved reference to 
abilities, citing for example a degree of intentionality and successful 
planning.  
The children showed a much less consistent pattern for true and 
reversed labelling; focusing only on the unlabelled condition, for 
                                                             
59 Cognitive Gadgets, p.208.  
60 A. Roige and P. Carruthers, Cognitive instincts versus cognitive gadgets: A fallacy. 
Mind & Language, 34(4), p.541. 
61 Even Heyes grants that appearances are against the “same kind” hypothesis: 
“Even when one studies the evidence of late development and everyday instruction, 
the intuition remains (I still have it) that, while learning to read print is a laborious 
business, learning to imitate, talk and read minds is like falling off a log” (Testing 
Cognitive Gadgets, Mind & Language, 34: 551-559, p.557).  
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younger children, 40% of those preferred were by artists, while 45% of 
those picked for quality were by artists; the comparable result for 
older children was 40% and 53% while for adults it was 59% and 
72%. Nissel et al conclude that “it appears as if [concerning 
judgements of quality] the 8- to 10-year-olds’ responses are on a 
trajectory in between those of the 4- to 7-year-olds and the adults” 
(24). But this trajectory is shallow, with the oldest children (10 years) 
still judging work by artists to be of better quality only about half the 
time; little obvious reason to postulate a biological force at work 
additional to enculturation.62 Also,  the details of the study do not 
indicate to what extent children’s judgements of quality were 
influenced by considerations of skill; no one doubts, we hope, that the 
ones by artists were in fact the more skilfully executed, but we would 
be presuming the truth of our own thesis if we concluded that 
judgements of aesthetic quality, as revealed by these experiments, 
were driven by sensitivity to skill.63  
At this stage we believe that very little can be said with confidence 
about the mechanisms that replicate a skills-based aesthetic 
sensitivity across the generations.  
  
7. Conclusion 
We have suggested that there are very ancient signs of what is also a 
very modern sensibility: delight in the appearances of artefacts which 
display, through their appearances, the personal qualities that 
contributed to their having those very appearances. Drawing on recent 
archaeological work we offered an account of the influence on this 
process of what we might call the lithic niche: those alterations to the 
environment of Acheulian agents caused by their use of stone tools—
alterations which radically reshaped social relations and created a 
need for the transmission of complex skills. We argued that this gives 
us grounds for thinking that the Acheulian was an aesthetic culture, 
though not, for all we know, an artistic one.   
Greg Currie 
Xuanqi Zhu 
University of York 
 
 
                                                             
62 The 10-year old group was small (8) and the proportion of their choices of artist-
works as showing better quality (48%) was below that for two year groups 
immediately below. Here are the proportions for that same judgement by year group 
from age 4 to age 10: 4:35%, 5:44%, 6:46%, 7:50%, 8:55%, 9:53%, 10:48%. Even if 
the figure for the 10-year old group is an underestimation progress looks slow.  
63 Though children “sometimes justified their choices [in favour of a picture by a 
child or animal] by crediting the effort the child or animal had made (e.g., ‘it’s really 
good for an elephant’)” (p.18, see also p.26).  
